


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NSA Declassification/Release
Instructions on File

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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 CODEWORD ROUTING SHEET

cup #3 of #5 / 12 May 64

TO	25X1	INITIALS	DATE
1		<i>4F41K</i>	
2		<i>ORR 8</i>	
3			
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6			
FROM	25X1	INITIALS	DATE
1	<i>DDI / CES / PEE</i>		
2			
3			

<input type="checkbox"/> Approval	<input type="checkbox"/> Information	<input type="checkbox"/> Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Action	<input type="checkbox"/> Direct Reply	<input type="checkbox"/> Return
<input type="checkbox"/> Comment	<input type="checkbox"/> Preparation of Reply	<input type="checkbox"/> Dispatch
<input type="checkbox"/> Concurrence	<input type="checkbox"/> Recommendation	<input type="checkbox"/> File

REMARKS:

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GROUP I
 Excluded from automatic downgrading
 and declassification

APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL

Appended document contains classified information within
 the meaning of Section 798, Title 18, United States Code.

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MEMORANDUM NO. 534

25X1 TO : [] SA/RR
 25X1 Attention: [] Collection Guidance Staff
 25X1 FROM : [] ORR Representative, [] 25X1
 SUBJECT : Chief, CSB/IS Comments on Subject of
 "USAREUR G-2 and the Soviet Ground Forces"
 REFERENCES: Your memo #1601-3, dated 12 May 1964

In reviewing any possible assistance I may give in support of your requests in above reference, it was essential that I coordinate such moves with [] 25X1

25X1 [] on Soviet military and other intelligence matters. Timing and the delicate nature of your request called for careful consideration as to the most practical approach to achieve the objective. The following comments from Chief, [] 25X1 describe our present relationship with ID/USAREUR and offer some practical approaches you may wish to consider:


25X1 1. [] showed me your letter asking to acquire information from ID/USAREUR in support of the working group and to arrange for contacts with ID analysts. Since this request falls within the responsibilities of this base in maintaining liaison with the military services, I would like to try to explain to you the climate in which such a request of USAREUR would have to be made.

2. "You speak of viewing "with despair this relationship". I can assure you, Charlie, that it hasn't reached that point; at least here we see no signs of desperation.

3. "It is quite true that USAREUR has attempted to confine contacts with this headquarters to single appointed officer who attempted to broker our requests for us, or to take care of them in conversations to which they bring properly qualified officers.

4. "This has had the effect of preventing "eye ball to eye ball contact" with analysts, but it has also had an advantage. USAREUR contends that this method permits them to staff out fully their responses to our requests and avoids the temptation of a single analyst to heavily load what may be a parochial viewpoint. Be this a true reason for these limitations or not, we really are in no position to challenge it and, in fact, it has worked out in several instances to our advantage.

16 JUN 1964

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5. "In this request that you have just made, we are moving into a very delicate area. Here you are asking us to arrange contacts with the field elements of your counterparts of the DIA/CIA working group. USAREUR could very easily inform us that they are keeping their superiors in higher command in the field and in their headquarters properly informed in support of their obligations to contribute to the joint working group. This would leave us with no real argument for inserting ourselves at this level in the search for information. We realize, of course, that your request is valid and would be productive. It is just a case of how much we can get away with at this time.

6. "Some of our friends within USAREUR tell us that they predict a loosening of the formalities of our present liaison arrangements. If this is so, it is possible that in the very near future, we might be able to arrange for such visits as that of which you speak, but I would certainly not be too confident of it.

7. "You might consider the following as a possible approach which might be helpful. If you could acquire the approval of the DIA members of the committee for us to make a contact here after the command had been properly notified or have a DIA representative come out, perhaps with one of your people, then I feel quite sure there would be no problems.

8. "Before doing anything we want to present for your consideration these possible approaches. We assure you that we are fully aware of the importance of this topic and are anxious to give you our most effective support. We are particularly concerned, however, that in our eagerness to get this job done we don't step on toes whose hurt might effectively retard the achievement of the objective."

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12 May 1964

Memorandum No. 1601-S

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT : USAREUR G-2 and the Soviet Ground Forces Problem

1. As I think you are aware, the DD/I is taking a critical look at information collection and processing related to the Soviet ground forces intelligence problem. This effort is directly tied in with the CIA/DIA Panel to study the size and quality of the Soviet ground forces. The [REDACTED] Guidance Staff has established a Working Group of OHR, ONE and OCI representatives, along with various [REDACTED] guidance officers to review in detail the present [REDACTED] posture and the potential for improved actions.

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2. Up to now we have concentrated on [REDACTED] NPIC is currently working on an extensive project to inventory all military facilities in the peripheral military districts. This project will provide for the first time a detailed template of the various types of military establishments. We also have been working closely with [REDACTED] and correlating that information with a large volume of fragmentary data from Russian periodicals. Using both of these inputs OHR should be able to make for the first time sound estimates of the organization and relative strength of the various ground force elements and be able to proceed from a firm base in tasking human collectors to obtain specific critical items of information.

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3. The Working Group is very interested in the possible raw data input that USAREUR G-2 could make to this problem. As you know there has been a traditional difference between USAREUR and ACSI, which has resulted in a serious lack of knowledge in Washington of what is available in Heidelberg. As we have concerned ourselves with this problem, we have followed with despair [REDACTED]

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4. I had thought you might be able to discuss this with [redacted] but understand you will be on holiday at that time. So, we will look forward to hearing from you direct.

15/

[redacted]

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